Lobbying is widespread in the European Union (EU). As of June 2013, no fewer than 5,703 interest representatives have signed up to the EU's transparency register. A large majority of these groups represent business interests. But how effective is business lobbying in the EU? When does business win and when does it lose in the context of legislative policy-making in the EU? We argue that business lobbying success in the EU is much more circumscribed than often expected. In fact, with much legislative activity in the EU being about greater market regulation and business frequently opposes such regulation, business tends to be in a defensive position in much of the EU's legislative politics. A new dataset on the preferences of more than one thousand interest groups with respect to 70 legislative acts proposed by the European Commission between 2008 and 2010 allows us to evaluate these expectations. We find robust support for our argument about limited business influence. This finding has implications for the literature on legislative decision-making in the EU and for the debate on the state of democracy in the EU.
Introduction
Business interests' attempts at exercising influence are omnipresent in the European Union (EU).
1 Illustratively, when the European Commission started work on antitobacco legislation in 2012, tobacco producers and retailers engaged in an intensive lobbying campaign. At the height of the campaign, the EU's health commissioner
John Dalli was forced to resign amidst allegations that he may have known of an attempt at "selling influence" to a Swedish tobacco producer. Similarly, in late 2012
and early 2013, the EU witnessed a massive lobbying campaign by US companies, including Facebook and Google, asking for changes to a proposed data protection directive. More than 3,000 proposals for amendments were forwarded to the European Parliament. Witnessing these lobbying efforts by business in Brussels and Strasbourg, many observers suggest that business power is rampant in the EU (Burley et al., 2010) . But so far systematic studies of the effectiveness of lobbying are rare. We thus ask: how much power does business really possess in EU legislative decision-making? When and why do policy-makers override business lobbying?
More concretely, when does business win and when does it lose?
We propose that business power in EU legislative decision-making is much more circumscribed than suggested in both popular and scholarly accounts. In particular, as most legislative proposals in the EU concern market regulation, and business mostly opposes market regulation, business faces a defensive battle as soon as the 1 Without the many respondents in the European Commission that were willing to be interviewed this research would not have been possible. We also acknowledge financial support from the Austrian Science Fund (FWF), project number I 576-G16.
European Commission puts forward a proposal for new legislation. With most Commission proposals eventually leading to legislation, in many cases business loses compared to the status quo and at best manages to limit the extent of the losses.
Citizen groups, by contrast, frequently support regulation, and face nearly certain gains compared to the status quo once the Commission becomes active. Moreover, business' ability to defend its interests may suffer further when the policy episode is marked by controversy and publicity. Hence we expect business to be successful in defending its preferences only when legislation is discussed with little controversy. Relying on a variety of approaches, we show that empirical support for our argument is very robust. In fact, our results indicate that on much of EU legislation the Commission together with citizen groups and the European Parliament want to change and business interests defend the status quo. The outcome ends up relatively far away from business preferences.
Our research builds on, and speaks to, a growing literature on interest group influence and lobbying success, both in national political systems (Alexander et al. 2009; Baumgartner et al. 2009; Bernhagen 2012; McKay 2011; Nelson and Yackee 2012) and at the EU level (Dür and De Bièvre 2007; Mahoney 2007; Schneider et al. 2007; Klüver 2013) . While only 15 years ago the study of interest group influence could be considered an area of "confusion" in the lobbying literature (Baumgartner and Leech 1998: 13) , these recent studies have contributed to a much better under-standing of conditions for interest group influence. The present paper adds a novel argument, a new data set, and new findings to this literature. The paper's contribution to scholarly debates is not limited to the interest group literature. As put by James March (1955: 432) half a century ago, " [i] nfluence is to the study of decision-making what force is to the study of motion -a generic explanation for the basic observable phenomena." The findings from our research, therefore, are of interest to the broad literature on policy-making in the EU. In particular, our study adds a crucial dimension -namely the role of non-state actors -to the burgeoning literature on EU decision-making (see, for example, Thomson 2011). Finally, our findings are of major importance for an assessment of the EU's democratic legitimacy. We show that citizen groups are surprisingly successful, and business interests surprisingly unsuccessful, thus casting some doubts on prior claims that policy outcomes in the EU are biased in favor of business interests.
Explaining success and failure in business lobbying
Actors are politically influential to the extent that they succeed in obtaining policies they prefer while averting policies they dislike, even if the latter are preferred by other actors (cf. Dahl 1957) . In the context of national policymaking, much of the existing literature suggests that business is frequently more influential than other actors. This may be so, first, because business has superior access to politically useful resources such as time, money and expertise, that can be traded for access to political decisonmakers and favorable legislation (Hillman et al. 2004 ). Second, business may enjoy a structurally privileged position in the policy process (Lindblom 1977; Przeworski and Wallerstein 1988) . Because major investment decisions in a capitalist system are usually private, pubic officials are very perceptive to the view of business actors (Lindblom 1977: 170-88) . While the classic accounts of business' structural power are found mostly in the context of redistributive taxation and social-democratic welfare politics (e.g., Quinn and Shapiro 1991; Swank 1992) , the same kinds of constraints apply to regulatory policy fields. Dryzek (1995: 15) , for example, asserts rather generally that "policies that damage business profitability -or are even perceived as likely to damage that profitability -are automatically punished by the recoil of the market." Thsi has been been argued for the case of the EU by Chari and Kritzinger (2006) . Third, business actors may be able to influence public policy by virtue of their control over relevant information (Ainsworth 1993; Austen-Smith 1993; Grossman and Helpman 2001) . While all interest groups may try to influence policy by means of strategic information transmission, business actors are particularly well positioned for this. In the course of performing their everyday activities individual firms constantly accumulate knowledge about relevant policy issues (Laffont and Tirole 1986) .
Corporations are also more likely to engage in research than other actors (Schlozman and Tierney 1986) . Jointly, these explanatory strands point to the expectation that policy outcomes are more often in line with the preferences of business actors than with the preferences of other organized interests.
Nevertheless, this account has not gone uncontested. Business actors may be better resourced to influence policy than other organized interests, but many non-business interests can muster considerable material resources to mobilize politically and attempt to influence decision-making. While capitalist political-economic systems give considerable political leverage to business corporations, Galbraith (1954) has emphasized how "countervailing powers" are mobilized by trade unions and citizen groups. More generally, liberal democracies have not been shy when it comes to regulating business. As Wilson (1995, 143) points out for the US, "business firms have been subjected to, on the whole, rising levels of taxation, increased regulatory supervision, and stronger injunctions against unfair labor practices."
Our analysis focuses on the time between the formulation of a new regulation or directive by the European Commission and the final decision on this proposal by the European legislative institutions. Hence we do not analyze the "seconddimensional" power relations that prevent some interests from successfully defining issues and placing them on the public agenda (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962) . In the EU as elsewhere, lobbyists would prefer to shape policy before it gets to the stage of public debate (Dunleavy 1991) . However, not all policy advocates manage to have their voices heard -and accommodated -from the start of the policy process.
While some organized interests may influence the Commission's policy agenda and formulation, they still have incentives to lobby in favor of delivery at the later stages, not least so as to counter lobbying from interests that come out to oppose the policy proposal in question. Furthermore, as Richardson and Jordan (1979) have argued for the British political system, policy communities and issue networks can fail to settle issues early on.
Our argument to explain lobbying success at the decision-making stage rests on three key assumptions. First, we assume that societal interests can exert influence on the positions held by member states and members of the European Parliament (MEPs). This assumption is plausible because member state governments and MEPs want to retain office, and thus strive to avoid concentrated opposition to their policies. We expect both business actors and citizen groups to be influential within member countries and at the European Parliament. Second, we assume that the European Commission is a strategic actor that in the EU, legislation can only be passed if a qualified majority in the Council (and a majority of the EP in cases in which the ordinary legislative procedure applies) support the proposal. Finally, we assume that the Commission is concerned about a loss of reputation in case that its legislative proposal fails.
Whenever these assumptions apply, the Commission should assess support for and opposition to a change in the status quo before making a proposal on a specific issue. It will only propose a change to the SQ if there is enough societal support (relative to opposition) to make a positive response by the Council and the EP likely.
What we should find on the legislative agenda of the EU, therefore, are proposals on which a move away from the SQ is likely given the constellation of societal interests.
Since the completion of the single market in the 1980s, most legislative activity in the EU is about regulating the markets in which business firms are active (Majone, 1994; Pedler and Van Schendelen, 1994) . While on these regulatory issues non-business groups representing environmental, health, consumer or labor interests often seek policy change, business actors frequently find themselves defending the status quo (cf. Long and Lörinczi, 2009; Boessen and Maarse, 2009) . Business is unlikely to take a common stance on such regulatory issues, however. Common regulatory standards, even if on a relatively high regulatory level, will reduce competitive disadvantages for some firms and facilitate intra-European trade. On average, however, we expect firms to reject stricter regulation. The European Working Time Directive, for example, has met resistance by employers throughout the EU for many years after it has been passed by the EU institutions in 2003.
With the SQ changing with high probability once the Commission puts forward a legislative proposal, business interests that want to preserve the SQ are likely to lose and citizen groups are likely to win. We thus hypothesize:
H 1 Business actors are less successful than citizen groups in influencing EU legislation.
We do not expect business actors to be equally unsuccessful on all legislative proposals in the EU. Following Schattschneider (1960) , many scholars emphasize how business interests attempt to shape the policy process quietly, avoiding conflict. Thus, Salisbury (1984) found that, while citizen groups tend to play more prominent roles in publicly visible arenas and newspaper reporting on organized interest representation, firms and trade associations seem to be more active in the less visible arenas (Salisbury 1984: 74-5) . Business groups are more likely to adopt an inside strategy, meaning direct contacts with decision-makers, than citizen groups (Dür and Mateo 2013) . Thus, much political influence seeking by business actors may take place behind the scenes. As Danielian and Page (1994, 1076 ) point out, "most interest groups fare best when they can work in the dark, when visibility is low and the scope of conflict is narrow... In contrast, when the spotlight is on and the public gets involved, political equality tends to prevail and special interests lose." This is a fortiori the case for business actors. In V.O. Key's words, the lobbyists for electrical utilities are "eternally on the job", while the lobbyists for the consumers are "conspicuous by their absence" (Key 1964: 166) . In their analysis of lobbying in Washington D.C., Baumgartner and Leech (2001) found that in cases where only one or two interest groups were involved in an issue, participation was predominantly by businesses and trade associations. By contrast, unions and citizen groups were more likely to be involved in the relatively more open and conflictual processes involving larger numbers of participants (Baumgartner and Leech 2001: 1204) . To the extent that the factors causing firms and business groups to dominate the quiet avenues of lobbying at the expense of non-business groups apply to the political system of the EU, we expect that, H 2 Business actors are more successful in influencing EU legislation the less conflictual the policy episode.
Research Design
The unique dataset that we use to assess our theoretical expectations comprises information relating to 70 EU legislative proposals (43 directives and 26 regulations, with 13 proposals decided by consultation, 51 by co-decision/the ordinary legislative procedure and 5 by another procedure) that the European Commission put forward between 2008 and 2010.
2 The proposals were selected by means of a stratified ran-dom sample of the population of all legislative proposals, which was subsequently filtered on the basis of a minimum level of public visibility. 3 Our sample, however, also includes six proposals for which this latter criterion was removed. The primary responsibility for the proposals was held by 17 different Commission directorate generals (DGs), indicating that we cover a large number of policy fields. Nevertheless, no fewer than 13 proposals were initiated by DG Internal Market and Services.
For our sample of legislative proposals, we conducted semi-structured interviews with Commission officials (often policy officers or heads/deputy heads of unit) that had particular responsibilities for the relevant legislative proposal at the time of its initiation, as well as a detailed knowledge of the negotiations that took place at this time. The interviews lasted on average 70 minutes.
The interviews were used to establish conflict dimensions (issues) within the proposals and policy positions taken by stakeholders on the issues. 4 In total, we identified 106 conflict dimensions, or about 1.5 issues per proposal. This disaggregation enables us to capture more fully the portion of a proposal that interest group took an active stance on, whilst facilitating a spatial conception of policymaking. Additionally, the single dimension of policy bargaining allows comparisons to be made across issues, both within the proposal and across proposals, and, by extension, across policy fields.
investigated).
3 Public visibility was defined through the number of occurrences in six leading national and panEuropean newspapers (Agence Europe, Euractiv, European Voice, Financial Times, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and Le Monde). This approach enabled the purely procedural proposals to be filtered out, whilst avoiding the overestimation of policy conflict associated with populations defined entirely by policy actors.
4 The precise question asked respondents to "...identify up to three distinct issues within the proposal" that involved at least one non-state actor.
The officials were asked to spatially locate the policy actors along an issue continuum ranging from 0-100. For this, we first asked for the position of the two most divergent positions with respect to the original proposal of the Commission. These policy positions were recorded at either end of a visual representation of the issue continuum (0 to 100). The officials were then asked to locate the policy alternatives initially favoured by the other non-state policy advocates on the policy continuum.
Again these were recorded to complete the picture of interest group lobbying. Next, the officials were asked to locate the policy positions favoured by the European Commission, the those member states that took a clear position on the issue', and by the party groups in the European Parliament.
5 With the actor positions completed the officials were asked to locate the position of the final legislative outcome. Finally, to complete the spatial model representation of the policy episode the officials were asked to locate the reversion point.
6 Figure 1 provides an example of the 106 constellations that were derived from these questions. 
Outcome
Through the interviews, we identified a total of 1,043 non-state advocates, of which 652 are business interests. The percentage of business interests in our data of 63 percent is thus close to the business share among the registrants to the EU's Joint Transparency register (56 percent after professional lobby firms have been excluded). The mean number of groups per issue is 9 and the maximum number of interest groups identified on a single issue is 28. Some groups were identified as active on multiple issues (maximum of 16 occurrences), leaving 461 unique non-state actors in our data set. We found that business groups are on average active across fewer issues (2.3) than citizen groups (2.7). There are missing values for 12 out of 112 reversion points; and 10 out of 112 legislative outcomes. As a consequence of the missing reversion points and legislative outcomes, when calculating a measure of success we lose about 10 per cent of the observations. Figure 2 shows the positions we identified for a subset of issues. 
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The identification of issues and the positional data rely heavily on the information provided by the 70 Commission officials. To ensure that this method has not biased our findings an additional validation of these results has been made. For half of the 70 proposals a formal consultation was held for which the Commission received written responses from interest groups. In each of these consultations, submissions were received from at least one interest group (the maximum number of groups that submitted a consultation paper and are contained in our data is 11).
The texts of these overlapping documents required manual coding, given the highly nuanced nature of the language. The initial results from this independent verification indicate that issues identified by the Commission officials were also live at this time of the consultation, and that the policy positions defined in the interviews correlate well with the positions identified in the documents submitted. Interviews with 70 interest group officials involved in these campaigns further confirm both the issue dimensions and the actor lists from the Commission interviews.
Measuring success
The approach that we use rests on the assumption that interest groups have single peaked and symmetric preferences. In other words, an actor has an ideal point on an issue; and it prefers outcomes that are close to this ideal point to outcomes that are further away. Figure 3 illustrates these assumptions, which are common to spatial models of politics. In this figure, Actor A has an ideal point of 20% on this issue. It prefers this point to 30%, but is indifferent between 10% and 30%. The figure also
shows that Actor A reaps a utility gain from any decision that is located between the reversion point (RP, in this example at 35%) and Actor's ideal point minus the distance to the RP, in this case 5%.
Given these assumptions, the simplest approach at measuring success is to calculate the absolute difference between an actor's ideal point and the outcome. The closer an actor is to the final outcome, the greater her success (e.g. Verschuren and
Arts 2004). Our measure of success (Success), therefore, builds on the idea that an actor is more successful, the more it manages to pull the outcome closer to its ideal point relative to the reversion point. If the distance to the reversion point was large, and the distance to the outcome is small, an actor should be considered highly successful (and vice versa if the distance to the reversion point was small but the distance to the outcome is large, the actor was little successful). Formally,
where the subscripts i and j denote the actor and the issue, respectively, s is the success measure, x is the ideal point, and O is the outcome. The larger s ij , the greater the success of actor i on issue j. Since we asked Commission officials to identify only those non-state actors that played a prominent role in a policy debate, we can expect salience to be a constant in our data set. Therefore, we do not weigh this measure of success by salience.
A potential objection to our measure is that distances may not be comparable across issues. That is, a gain of 50 on one issue may not be the same as a gain of 50 on another issue, as the 0-100 scales used in the interviews are determined separately for each issue. On one issue, what separates positions 0 and 100 may be a relatively minor aspect of a policy, whereas on another the difference may be much more important. 8 Since we asked respondents only about highly controversial issues, we do not think that this is a major concern for our data. Figure 4 shows the distribution of both Success and Success (di) using our data.
As can be seen, Success ranges from -100 to +100, with a peak at 0. It has a mean of 3.2 and a median of 0. This is about a standard deviation lower than the success score for an actor with random position, given the outcomes and reversion points 8 There are also some issues where only the extreme positions of 0 or 100 make sense (dichotomous issues).
9 In fact, users of the Decision-making in the European Union (DEU) dataset (Thomson et al. 2006 ) also treat spatial distances as comparable across issues (see Aksoy 2010; Golub 2012). included in our data set.
10 For Success (di) we find that a slight majority of groups is not successful. Note: because of missing observations for the outcome and the reversion point, we lose 326 observations.
Predictors and control variables
Hypothesis 1 stresses actor type as the main explanatory variable. We distinguish three types of actors: business, citizen groups and other (including institutions, professional associations, labor unions and governmental actors). We include Business and Other as dummy variables in the analysis. In one variant of the analysis, we break down Business in firms (F irm) and business associations (Bus.associations).
Hypothesis 2 emphasizes the degree of conflict on a specific issue. We operationalize conflict by calculating the standard deviation of interest group positions for each 10 A simulation with 1000 runs gives a mean of 9.7 and a standard deviation of 4.3.
issue (IG Conf lict). This variable ranges from 0 to 71, with a mean of 37 and a median of 42.
In our multivariate analysis below, we also include a series of control variables.
For one, it can be expected that the larger the number of groups that are pulling in the direction of the position taken by a specific actor, the greater the (likelihood of) success of that actor will be (Side, see also Klüver 2013). We operationalize this variable using the number of groups that coincide with the position of the actor, with 
We also include a variable measuring media attention in our model (M edia).
This is the number of times that six newspapers reported about a specific proposal.
As we expect media attention to have a marginally decreasing effect on the policy decision, we use the natural log of that number. Finally, we include a nominal variable coded 0 for directives and 1 for regulations (P roposal type). Our expectation is that groups are more successful when lobbying on regulations than on directives, because the national transposition constraint that applies to the latter may allow for less giving-in to interest group demands at the European level. For directives, we have 651 interest group positions, and for regulations 376 positions.
As our argument rests on the assumption that the positions of the Council and the European Parliament are influenced by lobbying, and thus reflect interest group positions, we do not control for them in our main models. When controlling for these positions, we rely on data from our interviews on the Council majority, the member states' positions, and the Parliament majority, all of which we have on the same scale as the one used to locate the interest groups. On the one hand, we calculate the absolute distance between a group's position and the Council majority (Distance Council). As we have a large number of missing values for the Council majority, we imputed these observations using the median position across the member states for which we have a position. On the other hand, we calculate the absolute distance to the European Parliament majority (Distance EP ). While on a average the Council tends to side with business interests, the European Parliament tends to be on the same side as citizen groups. 
Empirical Analysis Descriptive analysis
Our argument resulted in two hypotheses: 1.) that business groups are less successful than citizen groups and 2.) that business success is higher on less controversial issues with little conflict between interest groups. To facilitate interpretation we begin with a descriptive analysis of these questions. First, we look at the median positions of business and citizen groups relative to the median outcome and the median reversion point (see Figure 5 ). 12 The figure offers some interesting evidence: as expected in the argument, for a large segment of the EU's legislative agenda, the reversion point is located to the left (little regulation at the EU level). Business groups tend to be close to the reversion point. The Council is relatively close to business. On the other extreme, citizen groups pull towards more regulation, and are supported in that aim by the European Commission and especially the European Parliament. The median outcome is located exactly in the middle of the scale. For the question of success, this means that citizen groups gain a lot compared to the reversion point, and business loses, even if business groups are closer to the final outcome than citizen groups. Note: RP=reversion point; EP=European Parliament.
Next, in Table 1 we compare the mean values for business groups and citizen groups across our two measures of success and find support for our argument. Citizen groups turn out to be substantially more successful than business groups. 13 The 12 We use the median rather than the mean to avoid having the values influenced by occasional outliers.
13 And also the "random player" mentioned above in footnote 10 is more successful than business.
difference for Success is more than half a standard deviation. For Success (di), the proportion of successful citizen groups is nearly double the proportion of successful business groups. 
Multivariate analysis
We now turn to a multivariate analysis of our data, relying on ordinary least squares regression for Success and logistic regression for Success (di). Across all our models, we take into account that groups are nested in issues and proposals. We therefore estimate hierarchical models with random effects at both the issue and the proposal level (Gelman and Hill 2007) .
14 Table 2 summarizes the results, with citizen group as the base category for group type. Looking first at Models 1a and 1b, the coefficient for business is negative and highly statistically significant. According to the estimates for Model 1a, the disadvantage of being a business actors is a bit smaller than in the descriptive analysis, but still substantially important: business has a success score that is about a quarter of a standard deviation lower than the one of citizen groups. The effect is larger in the model using Success (di) (Model 1b): here the predicted value on 14 Likelihood-ratio tests indeed show that hierarchical models are appropriate.
the dependent variable is 0.72 for a citizen group and 0.34 for business (keeping all other variables at the mean or the mode).
Interestingly, the coefficient for the category of "other actors", which includes institutions, think tanks but also EU and foreign governmental actors, is also negative and statistically significant. Several of the control variables have the expected effect. Media attention seems to go hand-in-hand with more business success, but this effect is not statistically significant once controlling for clustering by issue and proposal. Greater conflict among interest groups is related to less success. The type of legislative act put forward by the Commission does not affect success. By contrast, actors' distance to the European Commission has a strongly statistically significant negative effect on success. The models have a reasonable fit: Model 1b, for example, correctly predicts 77 per cent of the observations.
In Model 2, we show that our results are not sensitive to controlling for the positions of political institutions (see Table 2 ). Concretely, we control for the distance between an interest group's position and the Council majority and the European Parliament majority. Doing so does not change our main finding, namely that the coefficient for Business is negative and statistically significant. As could be expected, however, greater distance from the political institutions reduces the success of groups.
Hypothesis 2 suggests that business success should be conditional on the degree of conflict on a specific issue. Concretely, we expect that business success will be lower, the greater conflict. Model 3 in Table 2 , which includes an interaction effect between Business and IGConf lict, strongly supports this expectation. When in- at attaining preferred policy output. As the interaction effect shows, however, the greater interest group conflict, the lower business success. Figure 6 shows the interaction effect included in Model 3 graphically. At low levels of interest group conflict, business and non-business groups cannot be distinguished in terms of lobbying success. Only as the level of conflict increases, the effect of business turns negative. 
Robustness checks
The findings are highly robust to changes in operationalization of key variables. For one, we check whether our results are sensitive to the specific operationalization of
Success that we used. In particular, it may be argued that a measure of success should not only capture the change of the outcome relative to the reversion point, but also take into account how far the outcome is from the position of an actor. In a hypothetical example with two actors A and B with ideal points at 50 and 100 respectively, using the operationalization of Success in equation 1 above, both gain 50 if the reversion point is at 0 and the outcome is at 50. But actor A may be seen as having been more successful, as the final outcome coincides with its ideal point.
To account for this, we create a second measure of success, which is calculated as follows (see also Bernhagen et al. 2013) :
Theoretically, this measure can range from 0 to 2. In the hypothetical example, the formula gives a value of 1.5 to actor A and a value of 1 to actor B.
In Model 4 in Table 3 , we re-run the analysis with this alternative measure of success. The result is substantially the same as for our first measure. The coefficient for Business is negative and statistically significant. Business thus is less successful than citizen groups in EU legislative decision-making.
Furthermore, Model 5 in Table 3 shows that disaggregating the business category to firms and associations does not change our results. The coefficients for both firms and business associations are negative and statistically significant. Clearly, therefore, we do not see powerful firms and weak associations, but both types of business actors with relatively little success in EU legislative decision-making. The other coefficients are very similar to those reported in Model 1a.
In Model 6 we show that our results are robust to assuming that all issues for which we are missing an outcome measure have failed, that is, that the outcome equals the reversion point. This adds seven proposals and nine issues to our data, Finally, not all issues are lobbied on by business and citizen groups at once.
Repeating the analysis for issues on which both business and citizen groups were active shows that the results are robust to this restriction (see Model 7 in Table 3 .
Business success, however, is higher on issues with no lobbying by citizen groups (for these 37 issues, the mean on Success for business groups is 13.5 as compared to -2.2 for the full sample). This indicates that what our analysis captures is the lobbying of citizen groups offsetting the lobbying of business groups.
Discussion
Popular and academic concern about business influence frequently assumes that business actors are both successful at promoting their own agendas and manage to avert policies that might be socially desirable but costly for business, such as environmental or labor regulation. Our findings suggest that the latter is rarely the case. We have argued and empirically shown that, at the decision-making stage, business interests are less successful in EU legislative politics than citizen groups.
With business interests mostly defending the status quo and citizen groups together with the European Commission and the European Parliament pushing for policy change, the former tend to be in a defensive position with respect to much legislative activity in the EU. Business success is both bigger and more likely on less conflictual policy episodes, when business interests face limited opposition from other actors.
These findings are robust to changes in the operationalization of success and the inclusion of numerous control variables.
The findings have major implications for our understanding of interest group influence and decision-making in the EU. With respect to the former, it counters arguments that business interests tend to be more influential because of the resources they possess, their greater mobilization, their privileged access to decision-makers or their ability to overcome collective action problems. With respect to the latter, we
show that policy outcomes in the EU tend to be a compromise between a coalition comprising citizen groups, the European Commission and the European Parliament and another coalition comprising most member states and business interests.
What does all of this say about business influence? It is of course possible that business is highly influential at the agenda-setting stage. What we observe at the decision making stage that is the subject of our analysis is then merely the struggle over the last chips on the table. Yet, the Commission proposals in our data are often diametrically opposed by business interests, suggesting that the agenda stage too might be influenced by interests other than business. Another qualification might be that business actors may be influential on the non-salient and non-conflictive issues that did not make it into our sample but that would be marked by a considerable degree of loophole lobbying by business. However, compared to the US, lobbying for loopholes is a less important aspect of interest group politics in the EU.
A more plausible interpretation would suggest that the entire project of European economic and monetary integration has been a great political success for European business. According to Scharpf (2001) , the agenda of European integration leading to the Single European At and the Maastricht Treaty consisted of "market-creating policies" that were strongly supported by business interests and that led to the single market and currency union. By contrast, the subsequent multitude of "market-enabling" and "process regulations", even if beneficial to the operations of European business actors, often cause costs for business and are frequently opposed by business actors. These are the policies that make up our sample, and on these business often has to give way to consumer and environmental interests siding with the European Commission. Thus, while the European Union might be seen as a project whose main purpose has been to serve the interests of European business, when it comes to regulating the way in which business is done in Europe, business actors are substantially less influential than is often perceived. 
